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In the last decade, most credit-industries registered a decline in lending volumes, while factoring 
industries instead registered a substantial increase in terms of volume. Since the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008, many firms, particularly SMEs, experienced greater difficulty in obtaining 
traditional bank funding. Conversely, the financial crisis increased companies’ demand for trade-
credits, and this explained the increase for factoring services. In particular, the total factoring 
volume in EU increased by 62% (from €990 to €1,606 in billions) over the period 2010-2017. 
Factoring provides a mix of financial services1 including credit protection, receivable 
management, and collections. It has now become a primary source of funding for most firms in 
Europe (the factoring and commercial finance was 10.4% of European GDP in 2016). Like banks, 
factoring companies are supervised in most European countries and it is critical for supervised 
authorities to understand if a greater competition in the industry would lead factoring companies 
to increase their risk-taking (e.g. financing riskier borrowers to increase their market power) or 
decrease their risk taking (e.g. becoming more selective in screening borrowers to minimize credit 
losses). The good functioning of the factoring industry is important to provide greater financing 
flows to companies. 
The competition-stability nexus has gathered a lot of attention in the banking literature 
(Goddard and Wilson, 2009; Wilson et al., 2010). Surprisingly however, past papers have 
essentially focused on the banking industry, omitting to consider other sectors within the credit 
industries. This is mostly due to the lack of data in non-banking financial institutions. This paper 
covers this gap and provides new findings on the relationship between competition and stability in 
the factoring industry. The main contribution of our study to the existing literature dealing with 
                                               
1 See Fiordelisi and Molyneux, (2004) for more details on the factoring industry. 
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the link between competition and stability is that, as far as we are aware, this denotes the first 
attempt at investigating this issue in a non-banking credit sector, such as the factoring industry.  
Specifically, we test our hypotheses by jointly analysing banking and factoring firms and 
controlling for bank characteristics and macroeconomic determinants. Firm stability is estimated 
using two variables: the Z-score and the Capital at Risk (CAR). Competition is estimated using 
the Lerner Index which is employed extensively in the existing banking literature (Carbò et al., 
2009; Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012; Liu and Wilson, 2013, Liu et al., 2013; Fiordelisi and Mare, 
2014, Degl’Innocenti et al., 2018, 2019; Clark et al., 2018, Fiordelisi, Mare, and Molyneux 2018). 
We use a panel-data vector auto-regression to examine the link between competition and bank risk 
measures.  
Furthermore, we make use of a unique dataset of Italian factoring companies (“Osservatorio 
sugli Intermediari Finanziari Non Bancari (OSSFIN) database). Our focus is on Italy for various 
reasons. First, credit institutions are major players in the Italian financial systems and, of course, 
banks are the most important credit institutions. However, factoring companies have grown 
consistently during the last decade and the Italian factoring industry is one of the major factoring 
markets in Europe with a total turnover of 209 Euro billions, i.e. 13.9% of the whole European 
market and 12.5% of the Italian GDP2. Second, factoring companies are supervised as specialized 
financial intermediaries and the link between competition and stability (both are aims of the 
supervisory authority) is crucial both in banking (where there is extensive evidence) and the 
factoring industry. 
                                               
2 Source of data: EU Federation website: https://euf.eu.com/total-factoring.html. 
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We find four main results. First, we show a positive link between firm market-power and 
stability in the credit industry (both factoring and banking) supporting the competition fragility-
view. Second, factoring companies are (on average) more stable than banks in the Italian credit 
industry. Third, we show that the competition-fragility view is weaker in the factoring industry 
than in banking. Fourth, the impulse responses of risk variables to variation in competition degree, 
and vice versa, mainly show significant patterns for the factoring industry. Particularly, we find a 
significant and negative response of the Z-score and the CAR in the short run to possible shocks 
in the Lerner Index, but such an effect tends towards zero in the medium term. Finally, we find 
evidence that the Lerner Index decreases as the effect of a shock in the Z-score, while increases 
because of a shock in the CAR in the factoring industry. 
Our paper provides new important insights to policy makers, practitioners, and academics 
that there are differences between factoring firms and banks in terms of stability (greater in 
factoring), competition (greater in factoring), and in their relationship (where the competition-
fragility view is weaker in factoring). Overall the factoring industry appears to be more stable than 
commercial banks and less vulnerable to financial crises because of the peculiarity of its business 
model. However, policy makers should be aware of the fact that the level of stability of the sector 
could decrease as the effect of the consolidation process and a consequent increase of the factoring 
firms’ market share. Furthermore, the creation of a niche of specialization in terms of industrial 
and geographic markets could further enhance the monopoly market power of certain financial 
intermediaries in the factoring industry in this way harming both the competition and the stability 
of the financial industry. In spite of the idiosyncrasies of the factoring business, commercial banks 
could still look at the practices adopted in the factoring industry to advance risk management (and 
potentially decrease non-performing loans). 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the factoring industry 
in Italy. Section 3 discusses the literature review and the hypotheses; Section 4 presents the 
methodology (Section 4.1.) and the estimation procedure for the competition measures (Section 
4.2) and stability (Section 4.3). Sections 5 presents the data. Section 6 reports the summary 
statistics and preliminary investigation, while Section 7 describes the empirical findings. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. An overview of the factoring industry in Italy3 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Italian factoring industry has seen a strong increase of 
almost 72.3% in terms of turnover. Furthermore, the relevance of the total turnover for factoring 
in Italy is almost 13% of the GDP and it has seen an increase of almost of 23% over the period 
2011-2016. Nowadays, factoring represents one of the major sources of firms to finance their 
working capital especially for firms operating in the manufacturing, service, and retail sectors in 
Europe. 
Factoring services can be offered by bank-related, independent, captive firms or banks. 
Commercial banks tend to create an ad-hoc firm within the group that deals with factoring 
services/products (e.g. UBI factor, Unicredit Factoring). Financial intermediaries that belong to a 
banking group cover almost 50% of the entire market in terms of turnover. Captive firms refer 
instead to firms that have been created by industrial groups to offer factoring products/services 
(e.g. GE capital), while independent firms do not do belong to any group. Captive and independent 
                                               
3 The source for the data reported in this section is Assifact, the Italian association of factoring. 
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firms deal with more than 10% of the total factoring turnover in Italy, while the remaining market 
share belongs to banks. 
In Italy, factoring firms are financial intermediaries subject to equivalent regulatory 
requirements of the banking sector (for example in terms of capital reserves and loan loss 
provisioning) based on the principle of proportionality. Instead, due to the characteristics of the 
business, factoring firms do not usually hold off-balance sheet activities. Furthermore, differently 
from banks, factoring firms cannot collect deposits.  
< Insert Table 1 > 
3. Literature review and research hypotheses development 
The banking literature has already thoroughly examined the link between competition and 
stability (Goddard and Wilson, 2009; Wilson et al., 2010). Higher competition is often related to 
more innovation (Cornaggia et al., 2015), greater efficiency (Casu and Girardone, 2009, Schaeck 
and Cihák, 2014), higher quality products and better prices for customers (Anginer et al., 2012), 
or it entails holding more capital (Beck et al., 2006; Schaeck et al., 2009). The economic conditions 
at the regional level play a pivotal role in affecting the stability of European banks (Liu et al., 
2013). Moreover, from a social welfare perspective, greater competition contributes to decrease 
the deadweight loss generated by market power via lower spreads (i.e., Harberger’s triangle - lower 
output and higher price) (Chortareas et al., 2012). However, competition can also harm the “charter 
value” of banks, in this way increasing the instability of the financial system (Allen and Gale, 
2004). Maximum welfare may engender negative externalities if it lowers bank stability. Indeed, 
regulation is justified by the presence of important barriers to entry that prevent proper 
contestability in banking triggering a more pervasive role for supervisors. Regulation is a 
particularly intricate determinant to assess as it can for instance a) soften competition by rising 
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barriers to entry, b) restrict banking activities, and c) alter the competitive position of banks via 
prudential rules (Degryse and Ongena, 2007).  
The theoretical concerns hinges on the link between competition and stability (Keeley, 
1990; Allen and Gale, 2004; Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). Several studies try to assess the extent 
of this trade-off. For example, Anginer et al. (2012) show that competition can increase stability 
at the systemic level. Other scholars, (e.g. Boyd et al. (2006) and De Nicolò and Loukoianova 
(2007)) point out that financial instability can increase in systems with low competition. In 
contrast, Beck et al. (2006) argue that more concentrated banking markets exhibit a lower 
likelihood of incurring systemic crises and might be more resilient than competitive markets. This 
is reasonable as, for instance, a well-organised cartel could be more effective in increasing stability 
than a large number of small competing banks or few larger institutions, which can be easier to 
monitor (Allen and Gale, 2000). Yet if so, this could involve a welfare cost. Cross-country 
empirical findings on the causality between competition, concentration and risk is mixed. Focusing 
on 45 countries over the period 1980-2005, Schaeck et al. (2009) show that more competitive and 
less concentrated banking markets are less likely to incur a systemic crisis. Fu et al. (2014), 
focusing on the Asia Pacific countries, postulate that concentration increases bank instability and 
that lower market power induces higher financial fragility. Focusing on 23 developed countries, 
Berger et al. (2009) show that bank market power can enhance riskier portfolios. However, they 
also find that the decrease of stability can be counterbalanced by a greater franchise value. Some 
recent papers employ multifarious factors able to explain the dynamics of the relationship such as 
regulation, institutional elements, and the economic environment. So far, a few papers have 
investigated the role of systemic risk and related the cost of government intervention to market 
power. Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) analyse European cooperative banks and find that the financial 
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crisis of 2007 does not affect the negative link between market power and bank stability. 
Soedarmono and Tarazi (2015) advocate that the financial crisis has modified market 
competitiveness and triggered banking reforms. Therefore, we posit that market power can in part 
shield financial institutions from economic downturns through for instance a margin effect 
(Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010), higher profits, and capital buffers (Allen and Gale, 2004).  
Various financial intermediaries are exposed to different sources and degrees of risk. 
Amongst them, the financial intermediaries specialized in the factoring sector appear to experience 
less loss rates compared to banks dealing with traditional banking credit in Europe4. In Italy, the 
percentage of non-performing loans on bank loans was above 10% in 2016 while it barely reached 
the 4-5% in the case of the factoring industry5. This difference of performance between these 
financial intermediaries can be traced to the peculiarities of the factoring sector since the funding 
is made against the trade receivables of the user business. Furthermore, the credit risk is distributed 
amongst the business’ debtors. This makes this form of funding less risky and accessible for small 
and less established firms. In addition, within Europe, the factoring sector is dominated by a variety 
of players (mainly represented by banks and bank-related financial intermediaries), which can be 
specialized on various industrial and geographical markets. This can affect the way these financial 
intermediaries compete with each other. 
We therefore formulate the following questions: is the competition and stability of 
factoring companies similar to banks? Is the relationship between competition and stability the 
same in the banking and factoring industries? And does a greater level of competition increase 
                                               
4 Source: EUF (2015). 
5 Source: Assifact (2018). 
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risk-taking in the factoring industry (the competition-fragility view6) or does it reduce risk-taking 
(the competition-stability view7)? We investigate whether factoring firms and commercial banks 
are exposed to the same competition-stability relationship. This could be relevant to understand 
the mechanisms underlying stability in a heterogeneous financial ecosystem characterized by 
various financial players more or less specialized in a particular product or service. The next 
section explains the data and the empirical strategy that we employ to address our research 
questions. 
 
4. Methodology and description of the variables 
4.1. The link between risk and competition 
To assess the risk-competition link, we employ a panel-data vector auto-regression approach 
(PVAR)8 that accounts for endogeneity concerns because of the reverse causality between risk and 
competition and allows for an examination of the impulse responses of risk measures to variations 
in the degree of competition (and vice versa). In particular, our baseline model is as follows9: 
                                                                                                             (1) 
where Y(t) includes risk and competition measures. Both risk and competition measures are 
considered as endogeneous variables.  consists of a vector of exogenous covariates, and B is 
                                               
6 Allen and Gale (2004); Forssbæck and Shehzad (2015) 
7 Boyd and De Nicolò, (2005); De Nicolò and Lucchetta, (2009) 
8 For our analysis we use the Stata program developed by Abrigo and Love (2016). 
9 For recent applications of the model proposed by Love and Zicchino (2006) and Abrigo and Love (2016) see e.g. Degl’Innocenti 
et al. (2018, 2019), Delis et al., (2014), Head et al., (2014). 




the matrix of the parameters to be estimated. Finally,  is the vectors of dependent variable-
specific panel fixed-effects. Finally,  indicates idiosyncratic errors.  
To reduce endogeneity issues due to omitted variables, we have time-demeaned the original 
variables. In addition, we have removed fixed individual effects. Next, we employ the GMM 
estimator of the model transformed by the forward orthogonal deviation that appear to perform 
better than the first difference (Hayakawa, 2009). For our analysis, we use traditional instruments, 
as our period is relatively short. As pointed out by Hayakawa (2016, 2019), conventional 
estimators using instruments in levels have comparable sample properties to the new instruments 
in a univariate AR(p) when T is small.  
Additionally, we run panel unit-root tests and we found no unit roots in the endogenous 
variables. Concerning this, as stressed by Abrigo and Love (2016), the GMM estimator can suffer 
from weak instrument issues if the endogenous variables exhibit a unit root. Next, we employ the 
procedure proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) for GMM models. This allows us to choose the 
number of lags to include in the model based on Hansen’s (1982) J statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions. The test indicates that one lag is optimal. As suggested by Hayakawa (2016), we 
employ generalized IRFs that do not depend on the ordering of variables as orthogonalized IRFs 
do. Then, we generate bootstrapped confidence intervals to get the impulse response functions by 
running 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations.  
Finally, we present the forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD). This allows us to 
assess the percentage of change in risk (competition) explained by the ‘shock’ to competition (risk) 





matrix obtained with the panel VAR approach. As suggested by Abrigo and Love (2016), we do 
not consider the exogenous variables when computing FEDV. 
The set of covariates, Xit, includes market share and performance. The latter one is calculated 
by using the return on assets, ROA. On the one hand, banks with a high market share or 
performance can wield a greater market power because of cost advantages and the capability to set 
higher prices (e.g. Fernandex De Guevera et al., 2005, Carbò et al., 2009; Clark et al., 2018). On 
the other hand, financial institutions with high market share and size in the market could also 
undertake risk-taking behaviour under the perception that big banks will be bailed-out if they find 
themselves in a distressed situation (e.g. Dam and Koetter, 2012; Hakenes & Schnabel, 2010).  
 
4.2 Measuring industry competition  
In order to measure market conditions in the banking and factoring industries, we employ both 
non-structural and structural indicators of competition. Specifically, we use a structural indicator 
of competition, i.e. the market share of each firm computed based on total assets. Differently from 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the market share allows us to investigate the competitive 
dynamics of each firm.  
We also use a non-structural indicator capturing competition at the bank individual level. 
Particularly, we use the Lerner index of monopoly power (LER), that has been largely adopted in 
past studies analysing competition in banking (recently, Turk-Ariss, 2010; Fiordelisi and Mare, 
2014 Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2014; Degl’Innocenti et al., 2018, 2019; Clark et al., 2018).  
The Lerner index indicates a firm’s capability to fix prices above its marginal production cost 
(LER=(  - )/ )), where P is the average selling price and MC is the marginal cost of itP itMC itP
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production. For both factoring companies and banks, we define one single output,  capturing the 
whole activity of the firm that is total earning assets. The output price, ,  is approximated by the 
ratio between total interest revenues and turnover in the case of factoring companies, and by the 
ratio between total revenue and total assets in the case of banks.  
 The estimation of the marginal cost needs the definition of the cost function for firms 
competing in the industry. Two very important issues have been addressed here: the definition of 
inputs and outputs in the banking and factoring industries; and the form of the cost function in the 
industry. Regarding the first issue, we define a single output ( ) for both factoring companies and 
banks (the total earning assets for banks) and three inputs for both factoring companies and banks. 
For both types of financial companies, these are measured in the same way: human capital ( ) 
measured by the total staff expenses); physical capital ( ) measured by the total value of 
tangible assets); and financial capital ( ) proxied by the total liabilities. Consequently, we 
define the input prices as follows: human capital price ( ) is obtained as the total personnel 
expenses and total assets; physical capital price ( ) is calculated as the ratio of other operating 
expenses and other administrative expenses to total fixed assets; and financial capital price ( ) 
is calculated as the total interest expenses over total liabilities. Regarding the second issue, we 
define a translog cost function (consistently with past papers, as Lu and Wilson, 2013; Fiordelisi 
and Mare, 2014; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2015; Clark et al., 2018; Degl’Innocenti et al., 2019)10, 
for each industry as follows: 
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for  
where TC denotes total cost (including personnel and administrative expenses, and interest 
expenses), Whjt are the input factors of the cost function defined for factoring companies and banks. 
Marginal costs can be calculated from equation (1) by considering the derivative relating to the 
single output (Y1it), which yields: 
   (3) 
Since banking and factoring industries have different features (e.g. banks have a distribution 
system based on a large number of branches and offer a wide range of financial services; factoring 
companies have typically few branches and focus on trade credit), we cannot safely control for all 
differences estimating a common cost function. As such, we estimate a specific cost function for 
each of the two industries. 
4.3 Measuring industry stability  
We use two main risk measures for our analysis. Specifically, we calculate the banks’ Capital-
At-Risk (CAR) that indicates how much capital a firm or bank would need to offset the risks that 
it is facing as a running concern. For the scope of the paper, we calculate the Earning at Risk 
(EAR), which is the worst change in earnings that a bank or firm is facing over a fixed-time horizon 
given a fixed confidence level. EAR is a common risk measure in the banking literature (Stein et 
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EAR is computed as follows: 
  (4) 
where η measures the firm or bank’s profit before tax (PBT); σ indicates the standard deviation of 
PBT; and z(1-α)/2 is the probability related to the α confidence level. In this case, we assume that 
earnings follow a normal distribution. Specifically, CAR then indicates the amount of equity 
equivalent to the current value of perpetuity of EAR that a firm needs to keep under the expectation 
that earnings will decrease permanently or over a longer term. The formula presents the following 
form: 
CAR=EAR/ROE                                                                                                                  (5) 
where ROE indicates the mean value of return on equity. A higher value of CAR suggests a higher 
risk for a firm or bank. Secondly, we introduce a bank stability measure that is the Z-score. This 
measure has been widely employed in the banking literature (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; Radic 
et al., 2012; Danisewicz et al., 2017). This measure is constructed as the ratio of the return on 
assets (ROA) plus the capital at risk (CAR) divided by the standard deviation of ROA (σROA). 
Consistently with Hesse and Cihák (2007), we calculate a time varying indicator of bank stability. 
Specifically,  is computed employing a cross-sectional approach and combining this with 
CARt and ROAt at time t for each firm/bank. Higher values of Z-score indicate higher degree of 
solvency and bank soundness. We take the log of the Z-score.  
 
5. Data  
 The lack of past studies dealing with non-banking credit companies is mainly due to the lack of 
data. For the Italian factoring industry data was obtained by collecting the financial reports of 




supervised factoring companies in Italy from the OSSFIN. There are no public source of 
information or data for factoring firms. On the contrary, there are various sources of data for 
banks. Specifically, we obtained data for 75 commercial banks over the period 2008-2015 from 
Fitch-IBCA BankScope (BSC). Overall, our sample includes both factoring and banking 
companies: we collected data for 33 factoring companies over the period 2008-2015 (707 firm-
year observations). The number of observations is reported in Table 2. 
< Insert Table 2 > 
We also summarize the definition and calculation procedure of our main variables in Table 
3. 
< Insert Table 3 > 
6. Summary statistics and preliminary investigation 
In this section, we report the summary statistics of the variables included in the model (Table 4). 
We observe a high variability among the firms included in the dataset in terms of size, Z-score and 
CAR.  
By looking at the industry competition, the Lerner Index (and the variables related to the 
inputs and outputs used to run the cost translog function) shows a similar mean level of competition 
in banking and factoring industries (i.e. 0.488 and 0.409, respectively). The magnitude of the 
Lerner index is quite modest suggesting that the competition is high in both industries. The lower 
level of market power in the factoring sector is driven by low prices. Specifically, the mean ratio 
of interest rates over the turnover (total flow of traded credit) declined by 0.59% in 2012 to 0.36% 
in 2016 and, similarly, the mean ratio of interest rates over the mean loan (i.e. annualized flow of 
traded credit) declined by 3.28% in 2012 to 2.06% in 2016.  
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< Insert Table 4 > 
Next, we report a preliminary investigation by comparing our stability and competition 
measures in the factoring and banking industries. Specifically, Figure 1 indicates the change of 
competition indicators in the factoring and banking industry. What emerges is that the competition 
level of the factoring market between 2008 and 2009 is higher than the one in the banking industry 
(Figure 1c). Specifically, the HHI evolution between 2008 and 2015 show both a substantially 
lower concentration (Figure 1a vs. 1c) in the factoring industry than in banking, and a lower market 
power (Figure 1b and 1d). Interestingly, we observe that the concentration has slightly increased 
in the factoring industry between 2008 and 2015, but this is not associated with a greater market 
power of factoring firms. Conversely, we note the slight decline in the banking sector, which is 
related to a market power increase (between 2010 and 2014). Both for factoring and banking 
companies, we note a decline in market power in 2015 (t=8). 
 
< Insert Figure 1> 
To have a first statistical test of differences between banks and factoring companies, we 
run a two-sample t-test with equal variance between the Lerner Index (Table 5). The results shows 
that the market power (Lerner Index) of factoring firms, on average equal to 0.403, is statistically 
and significantly lower than that of commercial banks, which on average is equal to 0.484. This is 
further evidence that competition in the Italian credit industry was greater in factoring than in 
banking. 






7.1. Main Results 
We employ a panel fixed effect model to assess the effect of competition on risk measures, Z-
score, and CAR. To start, we estimate the joint impact of the Lerner Index and the type of credit 
institution (factoring vs banking) on firm stability (Z-score). Specifically, we have created a 
dummy (labelled Factoring), which is equal to 1 for factoring firms, and zero otherwise (banks). 
Therefore, we can distinguish between factoring firms and commercial banks and to better control 
for intra-industry competition dynamics. We also include firm fixed effects and time*type of firm 
(i.e. year * Factoring dummy) to control for events that could have affected each company, and 
the industry in a different way over time.  
Table 6 reports the main results. Specifically, we find the factoring dummy has a positive and 
significant coefficient with respect to firm stability. This means that factoring companies are (on 
average) more stable than banks. Second, we observe a positive and statistically significant link 
between market power and firm stability (both for the Lerner index and firm market share). These 
results support the competition fragility-view as firm stability increases when firm market power 
increases (and so competition declines) as well. Interestingly, we find that the interaction between 
the factoring dummy and our measures of market power is negatively and statistically significant. 
This suggests that the competition-fragility view is weaker in the factoring industry than in the 
banking sector. Finally, our findings show a negative link between size and firm stability. This 
suggests that firm stability declines (on average) as firm asset size increases. 
As a robustness check, we also measure firm stability focusing on the CAR (columns 2 and 3). 
Results are strongly consistent, except for the link between the CAR and the interaction between 
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market share and factoring. Specifically, Market Share*Factoring impacts negatively on stability 
and positively on capital at risk; this would suggest that a consolidation process of the factoring 
firms with a consequent increase of the market share may increase their risk. 
< Insert Table 6> 
7.2. Impulse responses  
In this section, we calculate the orthogonalised impulse responses of the banks’ risk 
(competition) to competition (risk) shocks. Figure 2 shows the results for factoring firms, while 
Figure 3 shows the same or commercial banks. Figure 2a shows the change (Δ) in the Z-score 
because of a shock to the Lerner Index. Instead Figure 2b presents the results relative to change Δ 
in the CAR as a result of a shock to the Lerner Index. The solid lines show the response of these 
variables. Instead the grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. We consider three periods 
for the simulation horizon. 
< Insert Figure 2> 
Furthermore, we notice a significant and negative response of the Z-score to one standard 
deviation shock in the Lerner Index (Figure 2a). Specifically, one standard deviation shock to the 
Lerner Index will decrease the Z-score visibly in the first period. However, such an effect appears 
to tend towards zero in the medium term. We show a similar pattern for the CAR. However, the 
size of the response of the CAR to shocks to the Lerner Index appears to be more marginal than 
the Z-score. The Figure 2b shows that the impulse-responses of the Lerner Index to risk’ shock in 
the case of factoring firms. We note a statistically significant and negative response of the Lerner 
Index to shocks in the Z-score in the short term. In contrast, we notice that there is a significant 
and positive effect of the Lerner Index as the consequence of a shock to the CAR in the short and 
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medium term (Figure 2b). Particularly, after a slight increasing pattern, the Lerner Index declines 
again as the effect of a shock in the CAR. Therefore, we can argue that overall the Lerner Index 
exhibits a positive and significant trend to a one standard deviation shock in the CAR. Finally, we 
highlight that the confidence interval for the impulse-response function in the case of the CAR is 
rather large. Specifically, the confidence interval is wider after the first period. Even though we 
have transformed the data, we still find the existence of a heterogeneity effect in the response 
function of risk to change in competition. This effect is clearer after a single period of shock. 
Figure 3 illustrates the impulse response functions to the impulse-responses of risk to a shock 
to the Lerner index for commercial banks. Figure 3a reports the impulse-response functions for the 
Z-score and the CAR to shock to Lerner Index.  
< Insert Figure 3> 
Differently from factoring firms, we do not find any significant response of the Z-score to one 
standard deviation change in the Lerner Index (Figure 3a). Instead, the Lerner Index appears now 
to significantly increase for the effect to shock of the Z-score. However, such an impact is only 
significant in the short-term. Turning to the CAR-Lerner Index linkage, we did not find any 
significant effect for any impulse-responses functions (Figure 3b).  
Table 7 shows the Variance Decomposition (VDCs) where the forecast horizons consists of 
three periods. Particularly, regarding the Lerner Index and risk relationship for the factoring 
industry, Table 7 shows that almost 3% variation in the Z-score is explained by shocks in the 
Lerner Index, while 16% of variation in the Lerner Index is explained by shocks in the Z-score in 
the factoring industry. Similarly, about 15% variation in the CAR is explained by shocks in the 
Lerner Index, while 40-50% of the variation in the Lerner Index is explained by the CAR for 
factoring firms (in the 2nd and 3rd period). In contrast, variations in the Lerner Index are not so 
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relevant for the change of the Z-score and the CAR of commercial banks and vice versa. 
< Insert Table 7> 
8. Conclusions 
Competition is seen to play a pivotal role in spurring greater efficiency, innovation, and 
generally in favouring a more efficient allocation of financial resources. However, the recent 
financial crisis has raised some concerns among scholars and policy makers on its role in 
stimulating higher bank risk-taking (Degl’Innocenti et al., 2019). 
This paper offers new insight on the importance of the relationship between risk and 
competition for both the factoring and banking industry in Italy. To this end, we make use of a 
panel data model with firm, time, and industry fixed effects to analyse the relationship between 
risk and competition. Then, we use a panel VAR to examine the impulse responses of risk 
variables, Z-score and CAR, to changes in the Lerner Index, and vice versa. Our dataset 
encompasses 707 observations over 2008-2015. 
We obtain three main results. First, factoring companies are (on average) more stable than 
banks. Second, the stability of factoring companies increases when firm market power increases 
as well (and so competition declines): this supports the competition fragility view. Third, the 
competition-fragility view is weaker in the factoring industry than in the banking industry. Overall, 
our findings indicate that competition in the Italian credit industry was greater in factoring than in 
banking. 
Finally, we run a panel-VAR model to estimate banks’ risk measures reaction to competition 
shocks and vice-versa. We find that factoring firms’ response in the Z-score is significantly and 
negatively related to variation in the Lerner Index only in the short-term impulse responses in the 
factoring industry. Instead, we show that the Lerner Index decreases as the effect of a shock in the 
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Z-score, while increases because of a shock in the CAR. This suggest that competition will increase 
as the consequence of one standard deviation change in the Z-score or decrease as the consequence 
of one standard deviation change in the CAR. Finally, we find empirical evidence that competition 
decreases (the Lerner Index increases) as the effect of one standard deviation shock in the Z-score 
in the banking industry. In other words, this finding suggests that as a bank increases its stability, 
it also consolidates its monopoly market power. As a counter effect, this can harm competition in 
the banking system.  
Our paper provides important insights to policy makers, practitioners, and academics with 
regards to there being differences between factoring firms and banks in terms of stability (greater 
in factoring), competition (greater in factoring), and in their relationship (where the competition-
fragility view is weaker in factoring). Overall, the factoring industry appears to be more stable than 
commercial banks and less vulnerable to financial crises because of the peculiarity of its business 
model. However, policy makers should be aware of the fact that the level of stability of the sector 
could decrease as the effect of the consolidation process and a consequent increase of the factoring 
firms’ market share. Furthermore, the creation of a niche of specialization in terms of industrial 
and geographic markets (as in the case of the Italian factoring industry) could enhance both the 
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Table 1 – The GDP penetration of factoring and specialized credit in Italy 2011– 2016 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Factoring/ GDP 
10,46% 11,18% 11,13% 11,51% 11,86% 12,87% 
Specialized Credit 
(factoring, leasing 
and household credit 
sector)/ GDP 
16,8% 15,8% 15,3% 15,4% 17,0% 18,8% 
 
Source: Assifact e Istat 
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Table 2 – Sample composition 
This table reports the number of firm-observations in our sample for each year in Italy between 2008 and 2015 by 
distinguishing between the factoring and banking industry. 
 
Type of Institutions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Commercial Banks 53 55 62 68 68 71 71 67 515 
Factoring Firms 33 30 28 23 22 21 18 17 192 





Table 3 – Variables description 
This table reports the description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. All data for commercial banks has 
been collected from Fitch-IBCA BankScope (BSC), while data for factoring firms has been kindly provided by 
OSSFIN database. 
 
Variable Symbol DESCRIPTION 
Return on assets ROA Net Income/Total Assets 
Return on equity ROE Net Income/Equity 
Capitalization ETA Equity/Total Assets 
Z-score Z-score μ(ROA)+ETA/ σ(ROA) 
Capital At Risk CAR Earning at Risk/ROE 
Size Size Logarithm of Total Assets 




HHI  for all the banks and factoring firms. 
Lerner Index Lerner Index (P-MC)/P. See below for further details. 
Firm output Y Logarithm of total Earning assets 
Price of Labor P_Lab Personnel Expenses/ Total Assets 
Price of Fixed Assets P_FA Other Operating Expenses/Fixed Assets 
Price of Debt for 
Commercial Banks 
P_Debt_Banks Total Interest Expenses/(Total Deposits + Money Market+ 
Short-Term Funding) 
Price of Debt for 
Factoring Firms 
P_Debt_Factoring Total Interest Expenses/ Total Debts 
Total Costs TC Personnel Expenses+ Other Operating Expenses+ Total 
Interest Expenses 
Marginal Cost MC The marginal cost is calculated by using the translog function, 
as defined in the equations 2 and 3 
Price for commercial 
banks 
P_ Banks (Total Non-Interest Operating Income + Interest Income on 
Loans +Other Interest Income)/Total Earning Assets 
Price for Factoring 
Firms 



















Table 4 – Summary statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics used in the empirical analysis. 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95% 
Equity (*) 48,059.224 158,627.942 19.149 306,670.000 
Profit before Taxes (*) 6,145.805 25,245.219 -418.000 50,718.000 
ROA -0.054 1.771 -1.993 1.183 
ETA 0.116 0.112 0.033 0.349 
Z-score (ln) 3.259 7.414 -0.210 15.590 
ROE 0.020 0.204 -0.225 0.228 
CAR 11.815 1.902 9.020 14.975 
SIZE 9.617 3.143 4.529 15.435 
MS 0.022 0.060 0.001 0.143 
HHI 0.214 0.053 0.120 0.302 
P_Lab 0.020 0.016 0.003 0.052 
P_FA 17.820 50.517 0.322 92.143 
P_Debt  0.013 0.014 0.003 0.030 
Total Costs(ln) 6.165 2.983 1.620 11.231 
Y 9.881 3.606 4.389 15.913 
MC 0.037 0.152 0.007 0.051 
P 0.069 0.228 0.018 0.101 
Lerner Index-Commercial Banks 0.488 0.214 0.149 0.684 
Lerner Index-Factoring Firms 0.410 0.244 0.011 0.679 
     





Table 5. Comparing competition levels in factoring and leasing industry 
 
This table shows a two-sample t test with equal variances for the Lerner index by comparing banks (group 1) and 
factoring firms (group 2) in the Italian credit industry between 2008 and 2015. The null hypothesis states that there is 
no difference between the two group means. The symbols * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
Group No. Observations Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
(1) 
Banks 515 0.488 0.009 0.214 0.469 0.507 
(2) 
Factoring 192 0.410 0.017 0.244 0.376 0.445 
Mean 707 0.467 0.008 0.225 0.450 0.484 
(1-2) 
Difference  0.077*** 0.019  0.047 0.121 
Note: *** p<.01  
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Table 6 – Results 
This table reports the results of the regression where the dependent variable refers to firms’ stability measures, 
respectively the log of the Z-score and the log of the Capital At Risk (CAR). The independent variables are: i) a dummy 
variable capturing the type of credit-institution (i.e. 1 for factoring firms, 0 for commercial banks), the Lerner index, the 
firm market share. We also control for firms asset size calculated as the logarithm of total assets. We include bank fixed 
effects (Ai) and year*factoring fixed effects (By*f). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. 
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 y=ln(Z-score) y=ln(Z-score) y=ln(CAR) y=ln(CAR) 
Factoringt 23.451*** 20.439*** 0.304*** -0.860 
 (5.176) (5.643) (0.041) (0.599) 
     
Lerner Indext-1 1.441***  0.021  
 (0.513)  (0.030)  
     
Lerner Indext-1* Factoringt -11.748**  -0.003  
 (4.946)  (0.036)  
     
Market Sharet-1  53.952*  -3.169* 
  (31.496)  (1.644) 
     
Market Sharet* Factoringt-1  -69.165**  2.984* 
  (33.936)  (1.626) 
     
Sizet-1 -1.447*** -1.558*** -0.034*** -0.026** 
 (0.444) (0.553) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Constant 6.206*** 6.758*** 2.958*** 4.029*** 
 (1.840) (2.380) (0.161) (0.576) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year*Factoring FE YES YES YES YES 
Obs 707 707 707 707 





Table 7 – Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition 
This table reports the forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD) based on a Cholesky decomposition of the 
residual covariance matrix of the underlying panel VAR model and again using 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. It 
shows the percentage of variation in one variable explained by the ‘shock’ (i.e. change) to another variable over three 
periods ahead. There are two models. In the first model, there are Z-score and Lerner Index, while in the second one 
there are CAR and Lerner Index. The models are presented for both the factoring and banking industry. All variables 
are defined in Table 3. 
 
 












 Impulse Variable: 
Lerner Index 
  Impulse Variable: Z-
score 
Z-score   Lerner Index    
0 0.000 0.000 0  0.000 0.000 
1 0.000 0.000 1  0.018 0.034 
2 0.028 0.004 2  0.165 0.100 
3 0.027 0.005 3  0.163 0.110 
CAR    Lerner Index  Impulse Variable: CAR 
0 0.000 0.000 0  0.000 0.000 
1 0.000 0.000 1  0.048 0.000 
2 0.115 0.001 2  0.397 0.0001 




Figure 1 - The evolution of competition indicators in the Factoring industry 
This figure reports the evolution of competition and stability indicators in the factoring industry over time. Specifically, 
we report the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for factoring companies (panel A: top left), measured with the outstanding 
value of trade credits at the end of the year (HHI-ANT) and the overall value of all trade credits in the year (HHI-TR). 
In the panel B (top-left), we report the Lerner index for factoring companies. In the Panel C (down-left) and D (Down-
right), we report the HHI (calculated based on total assets) and the Lerner indices for banks, respectively. In all graphs, 
















Figure 2 - Impulse Response Functions for Factoring firms 
This figure illustrates the impulse response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to one standard 
deviation shock in other variables for the factoring industry. We employ 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations to get 
bootstrapped confidence intervals for the impulse response functions. We also subtract from each variable in the model 
its cross-sectional mean before estimation to remove time fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 
Panel A –Impulse: Lerner Index 
 
Note Figure (a) Test of overidentifying restriction: Hansen's J chi2(12) = 23.507 (p = 0.101); Figure (b) Hansen's J chi2(12) = 
12.939 (p = 0.114). Impulse: Lerner Index. Impulse Response Functions (IRF). 95% Confidence Interval (CI) generated by Monte-
Carlo with 1000 reps 
 
Panel B –Impulse: Z-score and CAR 
 
Note Figure (c) Test of overidentifying restriction: Hansen's J chi2(12) = 23.507 (p = 0.101); Figure (d) Hansen's J chi2(12) = 
12.939 (p = 0.114). Impulse: Z-Score and CAR. Impulse Response Functions (IRF). 95% Confidence Interval (CI) generated by 
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Figure 3 - Impulse Response Functions for Commercial Banks 
This figure illustrates the impulse response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to one standard 
deviation shock in other variables for the banking industry. We employ 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations to get 
bootstrapped confidence intervals for the impulse response functions. We also subtract from each variable in the model 
its cross-sectional mean before estimation to remove time fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 
Panel A –Impulse: Lerner Index 
 
Note: Figure (a) Hansen's J chi2(8) = 8.673 (p = 0.371); Figure (b) Hansen's J chi2(8) = 8.699 (p = 0.728). Impulse: Lerner Index. 
Impulse Response Functions (IRF). 95% Confidence Interval (CI) generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps 
 
Panel B –Impulse: Z-score and CAR 
 
Note: Figure (c) Hansen's J chi2(8) = 8.673 (p = 0.371); Figure (d) Hansen's J chi2(8) = 8.699 (p = 0.728). Impulse: Z-score and 
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Appendix A. List of Factoring Firms and Commercial Banks 
 
Commercial Banks Factoring Firms 
BancApulia  Abf 
Banca AGCI  Aosta Factor 
Banca Capasso Antonio  B. Farmafactoring  
Banca Carige Italia  Banca Ifis 
Banca Carige  BCC Factoring 
Banca Carime  Centro Factoring 
Banca Del Vomano  Coface Factoring 
Banca Di Saturnia E Costa D'Argento Comfactor 
Banca Emilveneta  Credem Factor 
Banca Federico del Vecchio  Credit Agricole Comm. Finance 
Banca Finnat Euramerica  Emil-Ro Factor 
Banca Generali SpA  Enel.Factor 
Banca ITB  Eurofactor 
Banca Ifis  Factorcoop 
Banca Interprovinciale Factorit 
Banca Mediolanum  Fercredit 
Banca Monte Parma  Fidis 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  Fortis Comm. Fin. 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA-BNL  Ge Capital Fin. 
Banca Nuova General Finance 
Banca Passadore & C.  IBM IT SF 
Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria Ifitalia 
Banca Popolare Del Mediterraneo Mediofactoring  
Banca Popolare FriulAdria  Meliorfactoring 
Banca Popolare di Bergamo  MPS L&F 
Banca Popolare di Mantova  Ries Factoring 
Banca Popolare di Spoleto  Serfactoring 
Banca Profilo  SG Factoring 
Banca Promos  Tex Factor 
Banca Regionale Europea  Ubi Factor 
Banca Santa Giulia  Unicredit Factoring 
Banca Sella   
Banca Sistema   
Banca Stabiese   
Banca Sviluppo Economico   
Banca del Fucino   
Banca del Lavoro e del Piccolo 
Risparmio  
 
Banca del Monte di Lucca   
Banca del Piemonte   
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Banca del Sud   
Banca della Provincia di Macerata   
Banca di Imola   
Banca di Sassari   
Banca di Sconto e Conti Correnti di S.  
Banca di Trento e Bolzano   
Banca di Valle Camonica   
Banco delle Tre Venezie   
Banco di Brescia San Paolo Cab  
Banco di Credito P. Azzoaglio   
Banco di Desio e della Brianza  
Banco di Lucca E Del Tirreno   
Banco di Napoli   
Banco di Sardegna   
BancoPosta-Poste Italiane   
Cassa Centrale Banca Credito Cooperat.   
Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena   
CheBanca   
Compass   
Credito Emiliano   
Credito Siciliano   
Credito di Romagna   
Dea Capital   
Deutsche Bank   
Dobank   
Extrabanca   
Farbanca   
Findomestic Banca   
FinecoBank Banca FinEco  
IBL Istituto Bancario del Lavoro   
Igd   
Imprebanca   
Intesa Sanpaolo   
Italmobiliare   
M&C   
Mediobanca  
Meridie   
Nuova Banca Dell'etruria E Del Lazio  
Nuova Banca delle Marche   
Nuova Cassa Di Risparmio Di Chieti   
UBS (Italy)  
UniCredit   
Unipol Banca   
38 
 





Table A: Lerner Index and Risk: Full Sample 
This table reports the results of the regression where the dependent variable refers to firms’ stability measures, 
respectively the log of the Z-score and the log of the Capital At Risk (CAR). The independent variables are: i) a dummy 
variable capturing the type of credit-institution (i.e. 1 for factoring firms, 0 for commercial banks), the Lerner index, the 
firm market share. We also control for firms asset size calculated as the logarithm of total assets. We include bank fixed 
effects (Ai) and year*factoring fixed effects (By*f). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. 
* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 y=ln(Z-score) y=ln(CAR) 
Factoringt 25.791*** 0.302*** 
 (5.273) (0.043) 
   
Lerner Indext-1 1.307***  
 (0.475) 0.021 
  (0.030) 
Lerner Indext-1* Factoringt -15.639***  
 (5.433) -0.004 
  (0.037) 
Sizet-1 -1.249*** -0.034*** 
 (0.416) (0.012) 
   
Constant 5.390*** 2.960*** 
 (1.720) (0.163) 
   
Firm FE YES YES 
Year*Factoring FE YES YES 
Obs 707 707 
Note: Robust Standard Errors. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
